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THE STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL
PROTECTIONS FROM ILLEGAL WIRETAPPING
AVAILABLE TO AN IMMUNE WITNESS
BEFORE A FEDERAL GRAND JURY
INTRODUCTION
The constitutional guarantees of freedom from illegal search
and seizure and freedom from self-incrimination have been inter-
preted to protect individuals accused of crime at every stage of
the criminal process. The fifth amendment guarantee against
self-incrimination has been secured by allowing a witness in any
criminal proceeding to stand silent when the answer required
would tend to incriminate him. Traditionally, a witness sum-
moned before a grand jury to testify to his knowledge on issues
subject to a grand jury investigation has had a fifth amendment
right to remain silent on the grounds that he might incriminate
himself.1 However, a governmental grant of immunity from prose-
cution, essentially a trade-off of one defendant for the successful
prosecution of others, relieves the immune witness of any basis
for objection under the fifth amendment and compels him to
testify or be held in contempt. The fourth amendment protection
from illegal search and seizure has been insured by permitting
the victim of an illegal search and seizure2 or the subject of an
unauthorized wiretap3 to suppress all illegally obtained evidence
if the state tries to use it against him in a subsequent criminal
proceeding. In order to make a motion to suppress evidence, how-
ever, the individual must have standing; he must be a defendant
who has been a victim of an illegal search and seizure. 4
1. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2252 (McNaughton Rev. 1961); see Counsel-
man v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892) (the United States Supreme Court
held that a witness in a federal grand jury had a constitutionally guaran-
teed, as opposed to a common law, privilege against self-incrimination
which could not be limited by the legislature).
2. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (the Supreme Court
ruled that in federal courts, evidence obtained in violation of the fourth
amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures would
not be admissible to convict the victim of the unreasonable search and
seizure).
3. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 374 (1967) (the Supreme Court
held that wiretapping without judicial authorization was within the pur-
view of the fourth amendment prohibition of unreasonable searches and
seizures).
4. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969) (the Supreme
Court articulated these dual requirements of standing, holding that a de-
Due to delay in receiving official reporters, the following citations
were omitted from the Comment, The Statutory and Constitutional Pro-
tections From Illegal Wiretapping Available to an Immune Witness Before
a Federal Grand Jury, on page 86 of Volume 76, No. 1. The following are
the footnotes that were incomplete:
14. In re Evans, 452 F.2d 1239 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
22. 452 F.2d 1239 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
23. In re Evans, 452 F.2d 1239, 1246 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
36. 452 F.2d 1239, 1243 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
38. In re Evans, 452 F.2d 1239, 1244 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
43. In re Evans, 452 F.2d 1239, 1251 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
44. 452 F.2d 1239, 1244 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
45. 452 F.2d 1239, 1242 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
46. Id. at 1243.
50. 452 F.2d 1239, 1251 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
51. Id. at 1252.
62. In re Evans, 452 F.2d 1239, 1258 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (dissenting opin-
ion).
72. In re Evans, 452 F.2d 1239, 1259 (D.C. Cir. 1971)
ion).
80. 452 F.2d 1239, 1242 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
84. In re Evans, 452 F.2d 1239, 1242 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
89. In re Evans, 452 F.2d 1239, 1270 (D.C. Cir. 1971)
ion).
92. 452 F.2d 1239, 1260 n.18 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
95. 452 F.2d 1239, 1246 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
104. 452 F.2d 1239, 1242 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
114. In re Evans, 452 F.2d 1239, 1266 (D.C. Cir. 1971)
ion).
193. In re Evans, 452 F.2d 1239, 1272 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
237. In re Evans, 452 F.2d 1239, 1273 (D.C. Cir. 1971)
ion).
240. In re Evans, 452 F.2d 1239, 1272 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
251. In re Evans, 452 F.2d 1239, 1251 (D.C. Cir. 1971).









A problem arises under the narrow circumstances in which
the Government as prosecutor seeks immunity for a witness who
has been unlawfully wiretapped. When immunity from prose-
cution is granted, the witness is not only required to answer all
questions; he also loses the right to object to evidence secured
through illegal searches or unauthorized wiretaps. Since the wit-
ness is immune from prosecution, he can never be a defendant;
thus he never has standing to suppress evidence obtained in vio-
lation of his fourth amendment right to privacy.' The device of
immunity seemingly enables the Government to violate statutory
and constitutional rights of citizens who, because of the grant of
immunity, are left without adequate procedural means of sub-
mitting the illegal Government conduct to judicial review.
There do appear to be circumstances under which a person
not yet a defendant may move to have illegally seized property
returned and the evidence obtained from the property suppressed.'
The motion to suppress is usually employed after the defendant
has been charged, 7 but it may be made prior to indictment." In
cases where the person making the motion is a target defendant-
the subject of investigation but not yet indicted-the courts have
allowed the pre-indictment motion to be madeY Although the
courts have recognized that they have jurisdiction to entertain
pre-indictment motions, the motion will generally be dismissed
without prejudice if there is an adequate remedy at trial or if the
individual cannot show irreparable damage.10 The jurisdiction for
granting pre-indictment motions has been exercised with caution.11
A stranger to a criminal proceeding, one not a defendant nor a
fendant who was not the victim of an unreasonable search and seizure
could not move to suppress evidence incriminating to him).
5. See discussion at note 25 infra.
6. See, e.g., DiBella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121 (1962).
7. FFD. R. CRIM. P. 41(e) states:
A person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure may move
the district court for the district in which the property was seized
for the return of the property and to suppress for use as evidence
anything so obtained on the ground that (1) the property was
illegally seized without warrant ...
The motion shall be made before trial or hearing unless opportun-
ity therefore did not exist or the defendant was not aware of the
grounds for the motion. . . . (emphasis added).
8. DiBella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121 (1962).
9. See, e.g., Grant v. United States, 282 F.2d 165 (2d Cir. 1960);
United States v. Harte-Hanks Newspapers, 254 F.2d 366 (5th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 357 U.S. 938 (1958); Centracchio v. Garrity, 198 F.2d 382 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 344 U.S. 866 (1952).
10. Hill v. United States, 346 F.2d 175, 178 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 956 (1965).
11. Silbert v. United States, 275 F. Supp. 765, 768 (D.C. Md. 1967).
target defendant, may move to have property illegally seized re-
turned to him. 2 It is doubtful that a stranger to the criminal
proceeding could also move to suppress the evidence derived
from his property.'
Increasingly witnesses subpoenaed to testify before grand
juries have been granted immunity from prosecution and have,
nevertheless, refused to answer questions on the grounds that
the subpoenas and questions were based on wiretaps made
without judicial authorization. 1 4 These witnesses have claimed
that such wiretaps were made in violation of the fourth amend-
ment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures and
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968.15 Four circuits have faced this problem and have reached
opposite conclusions. In Dudley v. United States6 the Fifth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals affirmed the civil contempt citation of a
witness who refused to answer questions before a grand jury.
17
The wiretap was made with authorization, but the court ruled
that regardless of the legality or illegality of the wiretap, a wit-
ness did not have standing to question the source of the Govern-
ment's information, and that Title III created no exception to this
rule.'" In United States v. Gelbard1" the Ninth Circuit sum-
marily disposed of the same issue in an identical fact situation
with a reference to Dudley. 20 However, the Third Circuit in
In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania in the
Matter of Jogues Egan2 1 and the District of Columbia Circuit
in In re Evans,22 quashed contempt citations where wiretaps were
allegedly made without judicial authorization.2 3 Because of the
Government's failure to deny the defendant's claim of illegal wire-
taps or to produce authorization, the court concluded that there
had been an unlawful wiretap.2 4 These four decisions represent
a diametric split of opinion between the various circuit courts of
12. Silverthorne v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920); Hale v. Henkel,
201 U.S. 43 (1906).
13. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, 450 F.2d
199, 226-27 (3d Cir.) (dissenting opinion), cert. granted, 92 S. Ct. 531 (1971).
14. In re Evans, 452 F.2d (D.C. Cir. 1971); In re Grand Jury Pro-
ceedings, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, 450 F.2d 199 (3d Cir. 1971); United
States v. Gelbard, 443 F.2d 837 (9th Cir. 1971); Dudley v. United States, 427
F.2d 1140 (5th Cir. 1970).
15. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1970) [hereinafter referred to as Title III].
16. 427 F.2d 1140 (5th Cir. 1970).
17. Id. at 1141-42.
18. Id.
19. 443 F.2d 837 (9th Cir. 1971).
20. Id. at 839.
21. 450 F.2d 199 (3d Cir. 1971) [hereinafter referred to as Egan].
22. 452 F.2d (D.C. Cir. 1971) [hereinafter referred to as Evans].
23. In re Evans, 452 F.2d (D.C. Cir. 1971); In re Grand Jury Pro-
ceedings, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, 450 F.2d 199 (3d Cir. 1971).
24. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, 450 F.2d
199, 201-2 (3d Cir. 1971).
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appeals. This Comment will discuss the Egan and Evans deci-
sions.
In Egan and Evans, the defendants, Sister Egan and Carol
Evans were subpoenaed before investigating grand juries. In
Egan a federal grand jury was investigating an alleged conspiracy
to kidnap a high public official, and commit other offenses. An
indictment naming six defendants had been handed down sev-
eral days before the issuance of Sister Egan's subpoena and had
named Sister Egan as a co-conspirator, but not as a co-defendant.
In Evans a federal grand jury was investigating the 1971 May
Day demonstrations of the Peoples' Coalition for Peace and
Justice held in the District of Columbia. Carol Evans was sub-
poenaed to answer questions concerning the activities of this
group. Both witnesses protested from the time of their first
appearance before the grand juries that the Government's sub-
poenas and questions were based on unauthorized and unconsti-
tutional wiretaps made by the Government. On the basis of sev-
eral objections, including fourth and fifth amendment arguments,
the witnesses refused to answer any questions. Eventually, the
Government sought and obtained immunity for the witnesses un-
der Section 2514 of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968.25 In both cases the witnesses continued
to refuse to answer any questions, and they were cited for civil
contempt and jailed until they agreed to comply with the district
courts' orders to testify.
This Comment will discuss the extent to which the sections of
Title III relied on by the Egan and Evans courts provide remedies
for victims of unlawful Government wiretaps. The analysis ques-
tions whether a witness who has been granted immunity and is
called before a grand jury to testify can make a motion to suppress
25. 18 U.S.C. § 2514 provides for "transactional" immunity from prose-
cution for any acts or transactions about which the witness testifies and has
been held constitutional as providing a privilege co-extensive with the fifth
amendment's against self-incrimination. See note 111 infra.
The Government in the Egan case applied for immunity pursuant to
18 U.S.C. § 6003 (ORGANIZED CrAE CONTROL ACT of 1970). This "use" im-
munity is much more limited than that described by section 2514, providing
that the witness' testimony will not be used as evidence against him. Use
immunity was granted Sister Egan on January 25, 1971. On the same day,
the United States Supreme Court dismissed certiorari in Piccirillo v. New
York, 91 S. Ct. 520 (1971), which involved the constitutionality of immu-
nty under section 6003, saying that the case did not provide sufficient
grounds for deciding such an important issue since New York law required
transactional immunity. Id. at 521. The Government, possibly a little
skeptical of the constitutionality of use immunity, quickly rescinded its
previous application and sought transactional immunity which was granted.
evidence obtained in violation of Title III. After concluding
that Title III does not provide a witness with the requisite stand-
ing to suppress evidence, in addition the Comment considers the
protections afforded immune witnesses by case law reflecting the
development of the exclusionary rule. The scope and objectives of
the fourth amendment prohibition of unreasonable searches and
seizures are discussed to; the extent that the evidentiary sanc-
tion of exclusion of evidence furthers these objectives. Alterna-
tive remedies to suppression of evidence are examined to deter-
mine whether they might successfully curtail illegal Government
wiretapping by compelling observance of constitutional protec-
tions. Before any examination of the decisions can be undertaken,
however, the content and interrelationship of the applicable sec-
tions of Title III must be understood.
I. INTERPRETING TITLE I11I OF THE OMNIBUS CRIME
CONTROL AND SAFE STREETS ACT OF 1968
A. Independent Application of Section 2515
Section 2515 of Title III is the basis for the holding of the
Egan court, allowing a witness to remain silent when questions
are derived from information obtained in violation of Title III. An
examination of section 2515, without reference to the other sections
of Title III, seems to indicate that the section does prohibit the
introduction of illegally obtained evidence into grand jury proceed-
ings. Section 2515 reads as follows:
Whenever any wire or oral communication has been inter-
cepted, no part of the contents of such communication and
no evidence derived therefrom may be received in evi-
dence in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or be-
fore any court, grand jury, department, officer, agency,
regulatory body, legislative committee, or other author-
ity of the United States, a State, or a political subdivi-
sion thereof, if disclosure of that information would be in
violation of the Chapter.
26
In Egan the court decided that a witness who was a victim of
an unauthorized wiretap proscribed by Title III could not be
forced to become a conduit through which the contents of the
tapped conversation would be presented to the grand jury. The
witness can prevent the testimony from becoming evidence by
simply refusing to answer the questions and asking the court to
exclude the evidence because its introduction into a grand jury pro-
ceeding is prohibited by section 2515. The majority and concur-
ring opinions in Egan agree that section 2515 prohibits the intro-
duction of evidence obtained in violation of Title III into a grand
jury proceeding. 27 The court sitting en banc vacated the con-
26. 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (1970) (emphasis added).
27. 450 F.2d 199, 209 (3d Cir. 1971).
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tempt citation in a very divided opinion. Part II of Judge
Adams' majority opinion received the support of five members of
the court.28 The reasoning was "[bly ordering Sister Egan to
testify before the grand jury when Congress had legislated the
exclusion of such evidence, [illegally obtained under section 2515
of Title III] the District Court simply acted inconsistently with
the legislative mandate. '29  An omission which appeared to puz-
zle the Egan court was that section 2515 does not provide a mecha-
nism for keeping the tainted evidence from the grand jury. Judge
Adams interpreted section 2515 to mean that the court must act
consistently with the legislative mandate and exclude tainted evi-
dence from all the proceedings mentioned in the section20
In the concurring opinion in Egan, Judge Rosenn stated that
the court must uphold the words of the legislation and provide an
evidentiary sanction 31 to the witness in order to prevent an ex-
plicit violation of Title III from being condoned by the court. If
a person is a party to a conversation illegally tapped by the Gov-
ernment and is subsequently called to testify in a grand jury pro-
ceeding he should not be forced to testify concerning the contents
of that conversation. 2 The witness must have available a remedy
which will prevent the Government from profiting from a violation
of Title III. Regardless of the fact that section 2515 does not pro-
vide an affirmative remedy, the concurring opinion in Egan held
that to allow the introduction of illegally obtained information is
contrary to the wording of section 2515. Judge Rosenn, concur-
ring with three judges supporting his opinion, stated the rule of the
court to be that a person who has been a party to an illegal wire-
tap,
should be able to stand mute and, in the event of a sub-
sequent civil contempt proceeding, raise the unequivocal
prohibition of Section 2515 [of Title III] as a defense to a
finding of contempt, unless the prosecutor can show an
untainted independent basis for the questions sought to be
asked.
3
If the sanctions of section 2515 are defensive, then the re-
fusal to answer questions resulting from an intercepted message
creates a new third-party privilege.3 4 The rationale of a third-
28. Id. at 217.
29. Id. at 209.
30. Id. This section of the opinion is the only section receiving a ma-
jority support.
31. Id. at 218.
32. Id. at 219.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 223 (dissenting opinion).
party privilege is worthy of examination. The privilege does give
the party to the intercepted message, called as a witness, the neces-
sary remedy to prevent the prosecutor from eliciting his testimony.
The fallacy of the privilege is that it does not prevent evidence
concerning the conversation from being presented to a grand jury.
The evidence may be introduced by the person making the tap or
in the form of the illegal tapes themselves. If the witness only has
a privilege not to divulge the contents of the tapped conversation,
but cannot prevent its introduction by another person, the invasion
of privacy of the person suffering the illegal wiretap remains
unchecked. The illegally obtained information can, furthermore, be
introduced at the trial of a defendant who was not a party to
the tapped conversation and he will not be able to prevent its
admission.35 In Evans the court recognized this defect, 36 as did
Judge Adams in his opinion in Egan37
The remedy suggested by Egan is reasoned from the prohibi-
tory language of section 2515 independent of other sections of Ti-
tle III. If section 2515 were the only section of Title III, it would
be clear that evidence obtained in an illegal wiretap could not be
used under any circumstances. 3 However, there are limitations
placed on the conclusive language of section 2515 by other sections
of Title III which specify what violations are covered by this sec-
tion. The Egan court did reference another section of the Act in
order to find a "violation of the Chapter."' 9
Section 2511 of Title III defines the violations of the chapter
which are encompassed in the prohibitory provisions of section
2515. The language of section 2511 reads in part:
(1) Except as otherwise specifically provided in this chap-
ter any person who-
(c) willfully discloses or endeavors to disclose, to any
other person the contents of any wire or oral com-
munication, knowing or having reason to know that
the information was obtained through the intercep-
tion of a wire or oral communication in violation of
this subsection....
[s] hall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned
not more than five years or both.40
Section 2515 specifically states that no evidence from an inter-
cepted communication can be admitted into evidence if disclosure
35. See Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
36. 452 F.2d , (D.C. Cir. 1971).
37. 450 F.2d 199, 204 (3d Cir. 1971). Part I of Judge Adams' opinion
was accepted by only two judges and is not the holding of the case.
38. In re Evans, 452 F.2d , (D.C. Cir. 1971).
39. 450 F.2d 199, 218-19 (3d Cir. 1971) (concurring opinion).
40. 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1) (c) (1970). For purposes of analysis this sub-
section defines the violation alleged in both Egan and Evans.
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of the information would be in violation of the Act. The Egan
court interpreted the language of 2511 (1) (c), prohibiting the wil-
ful disclosure of intercepted communications as a violation of the
Act; therefore, "no evidence derived therefrom" was admissible in
any proceeding listed in section 2515, including a grand jury pro-
ceeding.41 In light of other sections of Title III, it is difficult to
accept the reasoning that section 2515 can be read independently in
order to reach the result advocated in Egan.
42
The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals, with the
benefit of the Egan opinion, reversed the district court's contempt
citation of Carol Evans and remanded the case.43 The Evans
court realized that section 2515 cannot be read independently of
the other sections in Title III, 44 but on the other hand, supported
the Egan court's independent application as a narrow grounds for
deciding the issue.45 Chief Judge Bazelon delivered the opinion
of the Evans court, stating:
While I am sympathetic to the majority's [Egan court]
effort to base the decision on the narrowest possible
ground, and while I am inclined to accept the majority's
interpretation of § 2515 [of Title III providing for a total
preclusion of illegal evidence], I believe that § 2518 (10)
(a) [of Title III providing for suppression of illegally ob-
tained evidence] offers a stronger ground for decision.
46
These views are clearly inconsistent. If section 2515 prohibits the
introduction of illegally obtained evidence into any proceeding
listed in section 2515,47 there is no need for the Evans court to
base its decision on the suppression procedure provided in section
41. See note 39 supra.
42. 450 F. 2d 199, 218-19 (3d Cir. 1971) (concurring opinion).
43. In re Evans, 452 F.2d (D.C. Cir. 1971). 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10) (b)
provides the Government with the right to appeal an adverse judgment
granting a motion to suppress evidence. An appeal must be answered by
the reviewing court within thirty days to prevent unnecessary delays in
proceedings. In Evans the court acknowledged the rush, the fact that there
was no time to hear the appeal en banc, and decided the appeal on the
thirtieth day stating:
Because of the time and season factors, the opinions herein were
written on the basis of an informal exchange of views, with no
opportunity for careful study and reconciliation of differing opin-
ions as we customarily have.
F.2d at
44. 452 F.2d (D.C. Cir. 1971). Judge Bazelon appears to realize
the difficulties of treating section 2515 independently and retreats to the
legislative history to find that Congress intended Title III to be interpreted
as a whole.
45. 452 F.2d , (D.C. Cir. 1971).
46. Id. at
47. See note 26 and accompanying text supra.
2518(10) (a). Evidence obtained in violation of the chapter would
not be permitted to be introduced into any proceeding regardless
of whether or not it is affirmatively suppressed, thus making the
suppression section superfluous. The independent interpretation
given to section 2515 in Egan and Evans cannot be justified if Ti-
tle III is considered as a whole.48 The majorities, however, be-
lieve that to reach a different result would be inconsistent with
the whole concept of justice as they view it.4 9 Judge Wright of
the Evans court concurred in the opinion of the court, but ac-
cepted the opinion of Judge Rosenn in Egan as fully supporting
the disposition of the case on narrow grounds.0 Judge Wright ex-
pressed his opinion that to violate the explicit words of section
2515 "is to stand our whole system of justice on its head."51 Judge
Rosenn in his concurring opinion in Egan states "that on balance,
the public interest is best served by the result we reach. '52 The
majority in both the Egan and Evans cases relied on a very nar-
row interpretation of Title III to overthrow the contempt cita-
tions. The result of each case was to permit a witness before a
grand jury to refuse to answer questions based on information at-
tained from unauthorized wiretaps, regardless of the immunity of
the refusing witness. The difference between the decisions of the
Egan and the Evans courts is that the majority of the Egan
court found that the prohibition of section 2515 would serve as a
defense to a contempt citation for a witness who refused to answer
questions after he was unlawfully wiretapped; the majority of the
48. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10(a) (1970). This is the section of Title III
which is inconsistent with the opinions in Egan and Evans.
49. In interpreting section 2515 as a total bar to the admission of evi-
dence obtained by an illegal wiretap, the majorities in Egan and Evans have
apparently overlooked situations in which the courts have allowed admis-
sion of illegally obtained evidence. The United States Supreme Court in
Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954) allowed the introduction of
illegally obtained evidence against a defendant, who was the victim of the
search, to show that he wilfully committed perjury. The Court, in support
of this proposition, stated:
It is one thing to say that the Government cannot make an affirma-
tive use of evidence unlawfully obtained. It is quite another to say
that the defendant can turn the illegal method by which evidence in
the Government's possession was obtained to his own advantage
and provide himself with a shield against contradiction of his un-
truths.
Id. at 65.
It has also been decided in Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165
(1969), that illegally obtained evidence can be used affirmatively against
parties other than the victims of an illegal wiretap. The dissenting opin-
ion in Egan further suggests:
Another instance where disclosure of even an illegally intercepted
communication would be required by the proper performance of
the officers' duties would be the furnishing of information helpful
to the defense in a criminal case. Brady v. Maryland, 373, U.S. 83
(1963).
450 F.2d 199, 226 (3d Cir. 1971).
50. 452 F.2d , (D.C. Cir. 1971).
51. Id. at
52. 450 F.2d 199, 220 (3d Cir. 1971).
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Evans court found that an immune witness had standing to sup-
press evidence under section 2518 (10) (a) of Title III.
B. Section 2518-Limiting The Application of Section 2515
An independent interpretation of section 2515 ignores section
2518,13 entitled "Procedure for Interception of Wire or Oral Com-
munication." Section 2518(10)(a) sets up a suppression of evi-
dence remedy and defines the type of proceeding in which it can
be used and the class of people to be protected . 4 Section
2518(10) (a) states:
Any aggrieved person in any trial, hearing, or proceeding
in or before any court, department, officer, agency, regula-
tory body, or other authority of the United States, a State,
or a political subdivision thereof, may move to suppress
the contents of any intercepted wire or oral communica-
tion, or evidence derived therefrom, on the grounds that-
(i) the communication was unlawfully intercepted. .. .-
This section provides an unnecessary remedy, if section 2515 pro-
hibits the introduction of illegally obtained evidence into any pro-
ceeding. The majority in Egan avoided section 2518(10) (a) in
concluding that section 2515 prohibits the introduction of illegally
obtained evidence into any proceeding.56
The first limitation placed on the use of the suppression rem-
edy by section 2518(10) (a) is that suppression is available only to
an "aggrieved person." This phrase is defined in section 2510(11)
in the following manner: "'aggrieved person' means a person
who was a party to an intercepted wire or oral communication or
a person against whom the interception was directed. '5 7
Sister Egan and Carol Evans both allege that since they were
parties to an intercepted communication and persons against whom
the interceptions were directed, it is clear that they are "aggrieved"
within the definition of section 2510(11). Being aggrieved, how-
53. See notes 54-71 and accompanying text infra.
54. All ten judges deciding Egan and Evans recognize section 2518
(10) (a) as providing a suppression remedy. Rosenn, Seitz and Van Dusen,
J.J., concurring in Egan, and Gibbons and Aldisert, J.J. dissenting in Egan
do not find it necessary to decide if section 2518(10(a) is applicable since
they decide the case based on section 2515.
55. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10) (a) (1970) (emphasis added).
56. 450 F.2d 199, 209, 219 (3d Cir. 1971).
57. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(11) (1970). But see Alderman v. United States,
394 U.S. 165, 175 (1969) which refused to extend the exclusionary rule to a
defendant who was incriminated by illegally seized evidence. The Court
stated that since he was not a victim of the illegal search and seizure (al-
though he was "a person against whom the interception was directed"), he
could not suppress the evidence.
ever, does not in itself provide the availability of the suppression
remedy. The language used in section 2518(10) (a) requires that
the person aggrieved be "in any trial, hearing or other proceed-
ing. s58 The dissent in Egan interprets the language to mean that
an aggrieved party must be a party in the proceeding.59 To be
a party in one of the proceedings listed in section 2518(10) (a), one
would have to be a defendant, because each proceeding listed is ad-
versary in nature. Such an interpretation, that only a defendant
(and in rare cases a target defendant) may suppress evidence, re-
flects existing law.6 ° Therefore, defendants are the class of people
to be protected by the suppression remedy sanctioned in section
2518(10) (a), with the definition of an aggrieved person further
limiting the class of defendants to those who have had a message
intercepted in violation of Title III. The witnesses in Egan and
Evans are not defendants in an adversary proceeding and do not
come within the primary class to be protected, even though they
are "aggrieved" by the standards set forth in section 2510 (11).
Secondly, in reading section 2518 (10) (a), it becomes apparent
that the suppression remedy is not explicitly made available in a
grand jury proceeding in this section. A comparison of section
251561 and section 2518(10) (a), reveals that the same proceedings
are listed in the same order, except that section 2518 (10) (a)
omits the words "grand jury" and "legislative committee. '62 Both
of these proceedings are investigatory in nature and differ from
the other proceedings listed in section 2518(10) (a). The remain-
ing proceedings generally involve a decision adverse to one of the
parties. The exactness of the listing, when compared with section
2515, and the distinction between investigatory and adverse pro-
ceedings strongly indicate that the omissions were not inadvertent
and that Congress did not intend to make the suppression rem-
edy available in a grand jury proceeding.
In Egan Judge Adams seeks to cure the omission of "grand
jury" in section 2518(10) (a) by saying that, "[a] grand jury is em-
panelled and proceeds under the 'authority of the United States,'
and thus is included in the class of proceedings to which 18 U.S.C.
2518 (10) (a) is applicable. '63 If this interpretation is correct, why
did Congress distinguish "grand jury" from "authority of the
United States" and list each separately in section 2515 and then
omit "grand jury" from section 2518(10) (a) when listing the
proceedings in the exact order as in section 2515? The conclusion
appears to be that Congress intended to prohibit the introduction
58. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10) (a) (1970) (emphasis added).
59. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, 450
F.2d 199, 229 (3d Cir. 1971).
60. See notes 6-12 and accompanying text supra.
61. See note 26 and accompanying text supra.
62. In re Evans, 452 F.2d , (D.C. Cir. 1971) (dissenting opinion).
63. 450 F.2d 199, 203 (3d Cir. 1971).
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of tainted evidence into a grand jury, only if a motion to sup-
press were made and granted previously in an adversary proceed-
ing as defined in section 2518(10) (a). That is, the words "grand
jury" are included in section 2515 to apply to the narrow fact sit-
uation in which a defendant in a collateral proceeding has moved
to suppress evidence. Such evidence, if successfully suppressed in
the collateral proceeding, will be excluded from the grand jury
proceedings. An unindicted potential defendant who has not in-
dependently moved to suppress evidence but who is threatened
with criminal liability as a result of illegally obtained evidence
presented to a grand jury will have the opportunity to exclude that
evidence only at his trial.
64
It is further reasoned by Judge Adams in his Egan opinion
that the 1970 amendment to Title 11165 corrects the omission of
"grand jury" in section 2518(10) (a). 66  Section 3504 of Title III
provides the procedure for litigating sources of evidence. If a
"party aggrieved" believes that information was derived from an il-
legal wiretap and is to be used "in any trial, hearing or other pro-
ceeding in or before any court, grand jury, '67 he can present a
claim that the evidence is inadmissible because it is the primary
product of an unlawful act. The Government must come forward
and answer that charge. Section 3504 provides that a "party ag-
grieved" may make the claim.68 Sister Egan and Miss Evans can-
not be classified as parties, since there are no parties in a grand
jury proceeding. Consequently, it appears that section 3504 has
only extended the right of an aggrieved party defendant to claim
that illegally obtained evidence is being presented to a grand
jury proceeding.6 9 The remedy to prohibit the introduction of il-
legally obtained evidence into a grand jury is still the suppression
of that evidence in a proceeding listed in section 2518 (10) (a)
prior to the presentation to the grand jury. If a motion is not
64. United States ex rel. Rosado v. Flood, 394 F.2d 139, 141 (2d Cir.
1968).
65. 18 U.S.C. § 3504 (Supp. 1970).
66. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, 450 F.2d
199, 203 (3d Cir. 1971). The dissenting opinion also concurs with this rea-
soning. Id. at 225.
67. 18 U.S.C. § 3504 (Supp. 1970).
68. 18 U.S.C. § 3504(a)(1) (Supp. 1970).
69. Compare Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385
(1920). Defendant sought return of books and records illegally seized.
The Court ordered the return but the Government later presented copies of
the returned records to the grand jury. On the basis of the copies the
grand jury issued a subpoena duces tecum requesting the defendant to ap-
pear with the records. The Court quashed the subpoena.
first made and granted in a proceeding listed in section 2518(10)
(a), it cannot later be made within a grand jury proceeding.70
Section 2518(9) of Title III discloses another point which is in-
consistent with the Egan and Evans courts' interpretations of the
Act. This section requires the Government to furnish each party in
an adversary proceeding with a copy of the court order authorizing
the wiretap, at least ten days prior to a proceeding in which in-
formation from the tap is to be used.7 1 This notice is undoubtedly
intended to provide the defendant with enough time to challenge
the admissibility of the evidence. 72 As Judge Wilkey said in his
dissent to Evans:
It is wholly inconsistent with the scheme [of giving no-
tice that evidence obtained from a wiretap will be used
against the defendant] to say that 2515 is nevertheless in-
intended to permit grand jury witnesses to raise such a
challenge. To do so would be to find that Congress has
granted standing to raise a question about which it has
then withdrawn [failed to grant?] a right to notice.
73
The Fifth and Ninth Circuits have concluded that a witness
in a grand jury proceeding cannot make a motion to suppress
evidence by using the suppression procedure sanctioned in sec-
tion 2518 (10) (a). In Dudley v. United States7 4 the Fifth Circuit
held that section 2518(10)(a) did not create "a statutory excep-
tion which would permit a pre-indictment motion to suppress
evidence that might be presented to a grand jury. '75 In Dudley
a witness called before a grand jury alleged that he was a victim
of an illegal wiretap and moved to suppress the information ob-
tained from the tap. The lower court held the motion to suppress
premature under section 2518(10) (a) because that section did not
provide for a pre-indictment motion to suppress.7 6 On appeal, the
Fifth Circuit affirmed the ruling that section 2518 (10) (a) did not
provide for a pre-indictment motion to suppress. The court held
that a person moving to suppress must have as a prerequisite for
making the motion, standing as a defendant who was a party to
the tapped conversation.
77
70. If the defendant in a proceeding independent from the grand jury
suppresses evidence illegally obtained, he expects that it shall be prohibited
from use in any subsequent proceeding including a grand jury. Without the
prohibition in section 2515 pertaining to a grand jury the defendant could
not prevent the admission of previously suppressed evidence from reach-
ing the proceeding.
71. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(9) (1970). This section of Title III excludes grand
juries from the proceedings listed.
72. In re Evans, 452 F.2d , (D.C. Cir. 1971) (dissenting opinion).
73. Id.
74. 427 F.2d 1140 (5th Cir. 1970).
75. Id. at 1141-42.
76. Id. at 1141. The lower court went on to deny the motion to sup-
press because there was an authorization for the tap and thus the conten-
tion of illegality was without merit.
77. Id. The decision of the court was not based on the legality or
illegality of the wiretap.
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In the Ninth Circuit a case similar to Dudley arose. In United
States v. Gelbard8 a pre-indictment motion was made by a witness
before a grand jury, alleging an illegal wiretap and challenging
the constitutionality of section 2518. The witness requested per-
mission to inspect all applications, orders, tapes and transcripts re-
lating to any electronic surveillance conducted against him. The
witness before the grand jury made this request so that he could
determine if the information was obtained in violation of Title III.
If he found that it was, he would move to suppress that evidence.
The court dismissed his motions stating:
It appears to be settled that a witness in a grand jury
proceeding has no right to resort to a court to secure au-
thoritative advance determination concerning evidentiary
matters that arise, or may arise [prior to indictment] ...
Finally, we agree with the Fifth Circuit's decision in Dud-
ley v. United States, 427 F.2d 1140, 1141 (5th Cir. 1970),
"that nothing in the Omnibus Act [Title III], particularly
§ 2518 (10) (a) created a statutory exception which would
permit a preindictment motion to suppress evidence that
might be presented to a grand jury. . . . The legislative
history of the Act supports this conclusion. See Senate
Report No. 1097, 90th Congress, 2nd Sess. (1968) at p.
2195."'7
In Evans the majority distinguishes Dudley and Gelbard be-
cause they involved authorized wiretaps.8 0 However, the Dudley
and Gelbard courts decided that section 2518(10) (a) did not provide
a person with standing to make a motion to suppress prior to in-
dictment."' Once standing has been established, the merits of
the charge concerning the legality or illegality of the interception
will be considered. On the issue of whether a witness can make
a motion to suppress within the language of section 2518(10) (a), the
decisions in Dudley and Gelbard are contrary to the holdings in the
Egan and Evans cases. The reason for the split between the
circuit courts is that the Fifth and Ninth Circuits interpret the
"aggrieved person" phrase in section 2518(10) (a) as being an ag-
grieved defendant, and the Third and the District of Columbia Cir-
cuits interpret the phrase as being any person whose communica-
tions was intercepted in violation of Title 111.82
78. 443 F.2d 837 (9th Cir. 1971).
79. Id. at 838-39. The legislative history of Title III is discussed at
notes 90-107 infra.
80. 452 F.2d n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
81. United States v. Gelbard, 443 F.2d 837, 839 (9th Cir. 1970); Dudley
v. United States, 427 F.2d 1140, 1142 (5th Cir. 1971).
82. It is possible that, although the legality or illegality of the wire-
tap is not dispositive of the question whether the suppression remedy is
C. Civil Damages-Section, 2520
In enacting Title III Congress did not intend to leave a per-
son who was not in danger of criminal prosecution, but who was
a party to an illegally intercepted communication, without a rem-
edy. Section 2520 of Title III authorizes recovery of civil damages.
That section provides:
Any person whose wire or oral communcation is in-
tercepted, disclosed, or used in violation of this chapter
shall(l) have a civil cause of action against any person
who intercepts, discloses, or uses . . . and (2) be entitled
to recover from any such person-
(a) actual damages but not less than liquidated damages
computed at the rate of $100 a day for each day of
violation or $1,000 whichever is higher;
(b) punitive damages; and
(c) a reasonable attorney's fee. .... 3
In both Egan and Evans the Government failed to deny the charge
that there had been an illegal wiretap. From this silence it can
be inferred that there was probably an unlawful interception of a
communication in which each of the witnesses was a party. 4 The
probability that there was a violation of Title III qualifies Sister
Egan and Carol Evans as (1) aggrieved within the language of sec-
tion 2510(11)85 and, (2) eligible for civil damages under section
2520. The use of the phrases "aggrieved person" in section 2510(11)
and "any person" in section 2520, both of which describe victims of
a violation of the chapter, lends credence to the position that Con-
gress intended to distinguish between two classes of victims suf-
fering violations of Title III.
In Wolf v. Colorado 6 the need to have a suppression remedy
for one class of persons and a civil remedy for another, when both
have suffered the same illegal invasion, was alluded to by Mr.
Justice Frankfurter. "Indeed, the exclusion of evidence is a rem-
edy which directly serves only to protect those upon whose per-
son or premises something incriminating is found."8' 7 Mr. Justice
Frankfurter further indicates that those who "emerge scatheless
from an illegal search" are left to the remedy of private action.88
In Egan and Evans both witnesses emerged "scatheless" from the
available to a witness in a grand jury, finding the wiretap authorized facili-
tates the courts' ultimate determinations. In Gelbard and Dudley, the
legality of the taps made the argument against standing more acceptable
while in Egan and Evans the illegality of the tap made the argument for
standing more acceptable.
83. 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (1970) (emphasis added).
84. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, 450 F.2d
199, 201 (3d Cir. 1971); In re Evans, 452 F.2d , (D.C. Cir. 1971).
85. See notes 57, 82-83 and accompanying text supra.
86. 338 U.S. 25 (1949) (overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961) ).
87. Id. at 30-31.
88. Id. at 31.
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search, at least as far as criminal prosecution was concerned, and
thus are most likely meant to be relegated to the class entitled to
civil damages within section 2520. Neither person is threatened
with criminal prsecution because she has been granted immunity
and the extension of the suppression remedy to her would merely
confer the satisfaction of retaliation against the Government by
blocking other prosecutions.8 9
D. The Legislative History of Title III
The legislative history to Title 11190 begins by stating:
Because of the complexity in the area of wiretapping and
electronic surveillance, the committee believes that a com-
prehensive and in-depth analysis of Title III would be ap-
propriate in order to make explicit congressional intent
in this area.91
The dissenting opinion in Evans, while conceding that legislative
history does not have the same force as the statute itself, states
that:
what ... this legislative history regarding the compli-
cated area of electronic eavesdropping seeks to do is ex-
plain what Congress intended the words of the statute to
mean-an intent I believe we are bound to follow.
92
If a statute contains doubtful language, it is proper to resort to the
legislative history to find the meaning that the sponsors of the
bill attributed to the act.
93
The legislative history reinforces the statutory prohibition of
illegal wiretapping.
It is not enough, however, just to prohibit the unjustifiable
interception, disclosure, or use of any wire or oral com-
munications. . . . All too often the invasion of privacy
itself will go unknown. Only by striking at all aspects of
the problem can privacy be adequately protected ...
Criminal penalties have their part to play. But other rem-
edies must be afforded the victim of an unlawful invasion
of privacy. Provisions must be made for civil recourse
for damages.
9 4
89. In re Evans, 452 F.2d , (D.C. Cir. 1971) (dissenting opinion).
Though the denial of the suppression remedy to a witness may be a proper
interpretation of Title III remedies, civil damages seem a small price for
the Federal Government to pay for a proven violation of statutory and
constitutional prohibitions designed to protect the American citizenry.
90. S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968), U.S. CODE, CONG. &
AD. NEws 2112 [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 1097].
91. Id. at 2177 (emphasis added).
92. 452 F.2d , n.18 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
93. E.g., Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 390 (1951).
94. S. REP. No. 1097, at 2156.
Congress intended to discourage illegal wiretapping by (1) sup-
pression of the information obtained in the tap (section 2518(10)
(a)); (2) criminal penalties (section 2511); and, (3) civil re-
course to damages (section 2520). The question that must be an-
swered is: What remedy did the statute intend to make available
to a witness with immunity in a grand jury proceeding who was a
victim of an illegal wiretap?
The Senate Report on section 2518(10) (a) is clear on the point
that Congress did not intend to provide the suppression remedy to
a witness in a grand jury proceeding. The legislative intent is,
therefore, contrary to the decision of the Evans court, which al-
lowed a witness in a grand jury proceeding to suppress illegally
obtained evidence.9 5 The report states:
This provision [18 U.S.C. 2518 (10) (a) ] must be read in con-
nection with section 2515 and 2517, discussed above, which
it limits. It provides the remedy for the right created by
section 2515. Because no person is a party as such to a
grand jury proceeding, the provision does not envision
the making of a motion to suppress in the context of such
a proceeding itself."
Since the Senate Report explains that section 2518(10) (a) provides
the remedy for the right created in section 2515 and that it limits
section 2515, it is highly questionable whether the flat prohibition
or the defensive application of section 2515 advocated by the
Egan court is in accord with the stated legislative intent of section
2515.
97
The basis of the decision in Egan and Evans was that the word-
ing of section 2515 clearly prohibited the introduction of illegally
obtained evidence into a grand jury proceeding. Section 2515 does,
in fact, prohibit evidence obtained in violation of Title III from
being introduced into a grand jury proceeding. However, the Sen-
ate Report states that section 2518 (10) (a) limits section 2515: 91 "It
is the intent of the provision [section 2518 (10) (a)] only that when
a motion to suppress is granted in another context, its scope may
include use in a future grand jury proceeding. . . ."99 The inclu-
sion of the phrase "grand jury" in section 2515 is necessary to pro-
95. 452 F.2d , (D.C. Cir. 1971).
96. S. REP. No. 1097, at 2195 (emphasis added).
97. 450 F.2d 199, 209 (3d Cir. 1971).
98. The Senate Report on section 2515 further explains that this sec-
tion is neither an independent section nor a flat prohibition against the ad-
mission of illegally obtained evidence into any proceeding.
The provision [section 2515] must, of course, be read in light of sec-
tion 2518(10) (a) discussed below, which defines the class entitled
to make a motion to suppress. It largely reflects existing law ....
There is however, no intention to change the attenuation rule ....
Nor generally to press the scope of the supression rule beyond the
present search and seizure law. See Walder v. United States, 74 S.
Ct. 354, 347 U.S 62 (1954).
S. REP. No. 1097, at 2185.
99. S. REP. No. 1097, at 2195 (emphasis added).
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hibit evidence previously suppressed in another context from
reaching a future grand jury. Section 2515 does not provide the
remedy of prohibition. It does, however, define the type of pro-
ceeding in which illegally obtained evidence will be prohibited
after the motion to suppress is made in one of the adversary pro-
ceedings listed in 2518 (10) (a).
The legislative history of section 2518(10)(a) further explains:
Normally, there is no limitation on the character of evi-
dence that may be presented to a grand jury, which is en-
forceable by an individual. (Blue v. United States, 86 S.
Ct. 1416, 384 U.S 251 (1965).) There is no intent to change
this general rule. 10 0
In Blue v. United States,'0 ' the defendant was indicted on the basis
of information which, if used against him at trial, would have vio-
lated his fifth amendment right not to be compelled to testify
against himself. Blue filed a pre-trial motion seeking to dismiss
the indictment and the district court granted the motion. The
United States Supreme Court reversed, stating:
Even if we assume that the Government did acquire
incriminating evidence in violation of the Fifth Amend-
ment, Blue would at most be entitled to suppress the evi-
dence and its fruits if they were sought to be used against
him at trial.
0 2
The footnote following the passage states:
It does not seem to be contended that tainted evidence
was presented to the grand jury; but in any event our
precedents indicate this would not be a basis for abating
the prosecution pending a new indictment, let alone bar-
ring it altogether. 0 3
The citation to Blue in the Senate Report seems to indicate that
an individual does not have the right to prevent tainted evidence
from reaching a grand jury or to quash the indictment resulting
from the proceeding. The reason that there is no remedy which
can be pursued in a grand jury proceeding appears to be that gen-
erally the person whose indictment is based on tainted evidence
will suffer no harm since he can suppress that evidence at his
trial. The Senate Report explains that Title III makes the admis-
sion of previously suppressed evidence an exception to the gen-
eral rule that there is normally no limitation on the type of evi-
100. Id.
101. 384U.S.251 (1966).
102. Id. at 255.
103. Id. (citations omitted). See notes 205-219 and accompanying
text infra for discussion concerning admission of illegally obtained evi-
dence into a grand jury proceeding.
dence presented to the grand jury which is enforceable by an in-
dividual. Therefore, Congress intended the prohibition of section
2515, as it relates to grand juries, to be limited to the narrow
situation where evidence has been previously suppressed in an-
other context.
The Evans court attempts to prohibit the introduction of the
illegally obtained evidence into a grand jury by including a wit-
ness within the definition of "aggrieved person" in section 2518
(10) (a). If a witness is in the class to be protected by the sup-
pression remedy, then the witness can affirmatively suppress the
evidence.1 04 The Senate Report on the definition of "aggrieved
person" as defined in section 2510(11) explains that Congress
did not intend to include a witness within the class of people en-
titled to invoke the suppression remedy.10 5 Each of the cases cited
in the Senate Report on section 2510(11) involved a defendant in a
criminal proceeding who had moved to suppress evidence that
could be used against him at trial. An analysis of the cases cited
in the Sentate Report shows that, if they "reflect existing law,"
that law must be that an "aggrieved person" means a person who
has suffered not only a violation of his fourth amendment rights,
violated by an illegal interception of an oral communication, but
also a person who is a defendant in danger of criminal prosecution
as a result of the information seized during the search. 10 6 Sister
Egan and Carol Evans are not defendants and, although they are
victims of an illegal search, they are not within the "aggrieved per-
son" class envisioned by Congress as eligible to invoke the suppres-
sion sanction of section 2518 (10) (a).
Although Congress did not intend to include a witness in a
grand jury proceeding in the class of persons who can invoke the
104. 452 F.2d , (D.C. Cir. 1971).
105. The legislative history of section 2510(11) provides in part:
It [the definition of aggrieved person] is intended to reflect existing
law. (Jones v. United States, 80 S. Ct. 725, 362 U.S. 257 (1960);
Goldstein v. United States, 62 S. Ct. 1000, 316 U.S. 114 (1942); Wong
Sun v. United States, 83 S. Ct. 407, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); see United
States ex tel. Deforte v. Mancusi, 379 F. 897 (2d 1967) [sic] cert.
granted, Jan. 22, 1968, No. 844, 1967 Term).
S. REP. No. 1097, at 2179. United States ex Tel. Deforte v. Mancusi was af-
firmed in 392 U.S. 364 (1968).
106. Mancusi v. Deforte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968) (Defendant who was the
vice president of a local union was present in the union office when an il-
legal search was conducted. The information seized was used against him
at trial. The Court ruled the information was inadmissible.); Wong Sun v.
United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484 (1963) (Defendant moved to suppress
illegally obtained evidence which led to his arrest. The Court excluded
the evidence.); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 267 (1960) (Defendant
was in danger of being prosecuted for possession of narcotics found on the
premises of a place he occasionally occupied. The Court excluded the evi-
dence.); Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. 114, 120 (1942) (Defendant
whose fourth amendment rights were not violated could not suppress in-
formation used against him which was obtained in violation of section 605
of the FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS AcT, 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1934)).
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suppression remedy of section 2518(10) (a), it did intend to provide
a remedy for a non-defendant who has suffered an illegal electronic
surveillance. Section 2520 provides for money damages in a civil
action brought against the person making the illegal tap by any
person who is a victim of the illegal electronic surveillance.
10 7
The class defined in section 2520 is certainly broad enough to include
a person who, like Sister Egan and Carol Evans, is a victim of an il-
legal wiretap, but who is not in danger of being criminally prose-
cuted as a result of information obtained by the illegal tap.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEM-DOES A GRANT OF
IMMUNITY TO A GRAND JURY WITNESS OBVIATE FOURTH
AMENDMENT PROTECTION FROM ILLEGAL SEARCHES
AND SEIZURES?
There can be no question at present that wiretapping by the
Government without judicial authorization is violative of Title III
of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.108
After recent United States Supreme Court decisions overruling
prior contrary positions, 0 9 such wiretapping is now also a viola-
tion of the fourth amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches
and seizures.
The problem presented by the instant case is whether the fed-
eral government, after making an unconstitutional search and seiz-
ure may expunge the illegality by simply granting the victim of
the search immunity when he is subpoenaed to appear before a
grand jury. The remedy and procedure for a defendant who has
been the victim of an unreasonable search and seizure have been
long established in federal courts in the form of the exclusionary
rule. 110 The constitutionality of witness immunity which is coex-
tensive with the fifth amendment guarantee against self-incrimina-
tion has also been affirmed."' However, the conjunction of these
107. 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (1970).
108. 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (1970); see United States v. United States Dist.
Ct. for E.D. of Mich., 444 F.2d 651 (6th Cir.), cert. granted, 91 S. Ct. 2255
(1971) (the court held that the executive branch, including the attorney
general of the United States, is subject to limitations of the fourth amend-
ment when undertaking searches and seizures by wiretap).
109. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Berger v. New York,
388 U.S. 41 (1967) overruled Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
110. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914) (The Court ruled
that where property was seized by Government officers without a warrant
in violation of the fourth amendment, and defendant moved for their return
and was denied, it was reversible error to use this property as evidence
to support a conviction).
111. Carter v. United States, 417 F.2d 384 (9th Cir. 1969) considered spe-
situations-in which a person has been a victim of an unconstitu-
tional search and seizure and in which he has been granted im-
munity before a grand jury-presents a different constitutional
question.
Since a grand jury proceeding is not adversary in nature,
there are no parties as such to the proceedings. But one nominally
a witness may certainly be subject to indictment and self-incrimi-
nation making him subesequently a party to a criminal action. A
grant of immunity obviates the possibility that a witness will be-
come a defendant because of the acts or transactions testified to by
the witness.1 12 The usual procedure for asserting a fourth amend-
ment right is a motion for the suppression of unlawfully obtained
evidence in a criminal proceeding by a defendant with standing.
It would seem, therefore, that the Government's grant of immunity
to a grand jury witness, who but for the immunity, might sup-
press evidence later at his trial, enables the Government to (1) vi-
olate the fourth amendment proscription of illegal searches and
seizures with impunity, and (2) exploit its unlawful act by using
the otherwise tainted evidence to obtain an indictment or convic-
tion of a third person. This third person, since he is not a party to
the illegal search and seizure, cannot vicariously raise a fourth
amendment right of the unindicted immune witness." 3  The law
seems to supply no one with the means to object in this situation.
This device clearly circumvents the fourth amendment guarantee
of freedom from unlawful searches and seizures and lies at the
heart of the Egan and Evans cases.
It has been suggested that by the time the witness is granted
immunity, the harm has already been done and the violation is
complete. Since the witness is not in jeopardy of prosecution, no
further harm can result and there is no need for remedies other
than that for the invasion of privacy." 4 This argument overlooks
several fundamental facts: (1) The lack of effective deterrent
remedies serves to sanction unconstitutional Government conduct.
The prosecution can utilize the fruits of an illegal wiretap by com-
pelling disclosure of evidence by a witness whose knowledge be-
came known to the Government exclusively through its original
unlawful act of wiretapping. The subpoena itself may be based
upon an unauthorized wiretap. (2) Compelled disclosure by a
cifically the 18 U.S.C. § 2514 statutory immunity involved in the Egan
and Evans cases. See also Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892);
United States v. Harris, 334 F.2d 460 (2d Cir. 1964), reversed on other
grounds, 382 U.S. 162 (1965); In re Bart, 304 F.2d 631 (D.C. Cir. 1962)
holding constitutional immunities that were co-extensive with the fifth
amendment right against self-incrimination.
112. E.g., Carter v. United States, 417 F.2d 384 (9th Cir. 1969).
113. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969) (Defendant un-
successfully moved to suppress evidence, illegally seized from a third party,
from being used against him).
114. In re Evans, F.2d (D.C. Cir. 1971) (dissenting opinion).
Comments
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
witness who cannot object because of his immunity cleanses
tainted evidence, effectively making competent and admissible evi-
dence which is derived from a blatantly unlawful act. (3) Further
harm is suffered by the witness through compelled disclosure to
grand jurors and through probable subsequent disclosure at public
trial. The witness is implicated in the Government's illegality and
forced to prove its case, in addition to being subjected to public
opprobrium.
A. Interdependency of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments
In early Supreme Court decisions, there was often a tendency
to interpret the fourth amendment prohibition against unlawful
searches and seizures only in conjunction with the fifth amend-
ment right against self-incrimination. In Boyd v. United States"'5
the Court struck down a statute that compelled a defendant either
to produce his private books and papers to disprove Government
allegations, or to admit the truth of those allegations.' 6 The
Court stated that the fourth and fifth amendments "run almost
into each other" and that it was not merely the breaking into a
man's house but the use of evidence obtained thereby to convict
him which was to be condemned,11 7 This proposition is cited
with approval by the majority of the Court in Mapp v. Ohio.118
Mr. Justice Black consistently held that the fourth amendment
alone could not justify the suppression of evidence obtained by an
unreasonable search and seizure." 9  Even more recently, in Cool-
idge v. New Hampshire,12 0 Mr. Justice Black stated that the fourth
amendment contained no exclusionary rule, but that the fifth
amendment alone was the basis for the exclusion of improperly
obtained evidence.
12'
The interrelationship of the fourth and fifth amendments may
be implicit in the exclusionary rule as originally fashioned. The
function of the evidentiary sanction was then conceived to be pri-
marily the preclusion of evidence, unconstitutionally obtained,
115. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
116. Id. at 630.
117. Id.
118. 367 U.S. 643, 645-47 (1961).
119. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 661-62 (1961) (concurring
opinion); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 39-40 (1949) (concurring opinion).
120. 91 S. Ct. 2022 (1971).
121. Id. at 2054. (dissenting opinion) (The fourth amendment pro-
vides nothing saying that evidence obtained in violation of its prescrip-
tions must be excluded. The fifth amendment prohibition against self-in-
crimination is the only basis for exclusion of evidence).
from incriminating a defendant in a federal criminal trial.122 In
Gouled v. United States123 the Court used language to indicate that
the exclusion rested predominantly on the fifth amendment.
124
And in Agnello v. United States 125 it was said that the fifth
amendment, properly invoked, protects the individual from in-
crimination by use of evidence obtained through a search and seiz-
ure in violation of the fourth amendment.
1 26
However, where there has been an illegal search and seizure,
but no danger of incrimination of the witness, (as in the Egan and
Evans cases) the fourth amendment loses much of its signifi-
cance if it must be coupled with the fifth amendment for enforce-
ment. Suppression of evidence may function to prevent self-in-
crimination in many cases, but there are other situations which
indicate that there is no absolute nexus between the fourth and
fifth amendment protections. It has been held that a corporation
may suppress evidence under the fourth amendment but has no
privilege against incrimination under the fifth amendment. 27
Professor Wigmore has pointed out that "there is no intimate re-
lation between the fourth and fifth amendments .... The two
doctrines have had totally different political and legal histories.
.. 12 It may be that the courts have had difficulty in justify-
ing the exclusionary rule on the grounds of illegal searches and
seizures alone, since the words seem to prohibit the search and
seizure only. 129 To support the Court's development of a motion to
suppress, the privilege against self-incrimination was also claimed
as the basis. 1 0 There is an equally weighty argument that the
fourth amendment may stand alone in granting protections from
searches and seizures.
B. Independence of the Fourth Amendment-The Right to Pri-
vacy
There have been many dicta and much legal commentary to
122. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
123. 255 U.S. 298 (1921) (Defendant was convicted of conspiracy to
defraud the United States, in part, by evidence seized from his office by
Army Intelligence Officers without a warrant).
124. Id. at 306.
125. 269 U.S. 20 (1925) (Defendant was convicted of possession of nar-
cotics with evidence seized by a warrantless search of his residence).
126. Id. at 34.
127. See, e.g., Silverthorne v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1919); Hale
v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
128. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2184a (McNaughton Rev. 1961). See also
Mascolo, The Use at Trial of Suppression Hearing Admissions: An Erosion
of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 72 Dicx. L. REv. 1, 12-15 (1967).
129. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated .... (emphasis supplied).
130. Comment, Search and Seizure in Illinois: Enforcement of the Con-
stitutional Right to Privacy, 47 Nw. . REv. 491, 495-96 (1952).
Comments
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
the effect that the fourth amendment creates a right to privacy.' 3 '
Dissenting in HaTris v. United States,"32 Mr. Justice Frankfurter
ascribed the right of privacy to the fourth amendment even from
its inception."13 He stated that Boyd v. United States 1 4 gave legal
effect to the broad historic policy of a right against Government
invasion of individual privacy, 13 5 and that with few deviations,
the Court has construed the fourth amendment "liberally to safe-
guard the right to privacy.""16  Mr. Justice Brandeis in his dis-
sent to the narrowing of the scope of the fourth amendment by
the majority of the Court in Olmstead v. United States"' argued
for a guarantee of a broad right to privacy."38 In Wolf v. Colo-
rado139 the court stated that the security of one's privacy was at
the core of the fourth amendment and basic to a free society.
140
The Court subsequently referred to Wolf as recognizing the right
to privacy and extended the exclusionary rule to the States as
constitutionally mandated by the fourth amendment's application
through the fourteenth amendment. 141 But more recently, in Katz
v. United States, 42 it was stated that:
[T] he fourth amendment cannot be translated into a gen-
eral constitutional right to privacy. That amendment pro-
tects individual privacy against certain kinds of govern-
mental intrusion, but its protections go further, and often
have nothing to do with privacy.'
43
It would be misleading to suggest that the Supreme Court would
131. Beaney, The Constitutional Right to Privacy in the Supreme Court,
1962 SuPPM. COURr REV. 212. See cases and commentary discussed
throughout.
132. 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
133. Id. at 155-57 (dissenting opinion).
134. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
135. 331 U.S. 145, 160, (1947) (dissenting opinion).
136. Id. at 159.
137. 277 U.S. 438 (1927) (The Court held that an unauthorized wire-
tap by federal officers was not a violation of the fourth amendment's
proscription of unreasonable searches and seizures).
138. Id. at 471 (dissenting opinion). See also Beaney, supra 1962 Su-
PREME COURT REV. 212, 227; Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4
HARv. L. REV. 193 (1890).
139. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
140. Id. at 27. The Court recognized the right but refused to extend
the exclusionary rule through the fourteenth amendment. Wolf was over-
ruled to that extent by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
It is also significant that Wolf makes no reference to the self-incrimi-
nation privilege of the fifth amendment. See Allen, The Wolf Case: Search
and Seizure, Federalism, and the Civil Liberties, 45 ILL. L. REV. 1 (1950).
141. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
142. 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (The Court held that unauthorized wire-tap-
ping was within the purview of the fourth amendment prohibition).
143. Id. at 350.
at present unanimously hold that the fourth amendment provides
a right to privacy or that the exclusionary rule can effectively pro-
tect privacy. The majority of the Court in Coolidge v. New Hamp-
shire14 4 upheld the exclusion of evidence on the basis of the fourth
amendment alone but did so in the context of reviewing a criminal
conviction supported by evidence obtained without a valid search
warrant.' 4 ' The four dissenting and concurring opinions and the
concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan in Coolidge make it clear
that neither the application of the exclusionary rule nor the di-
rection of fourth amendment policies is firmly established at pres-
ent.
14 6
C. Fourth Amendment Policies Behind the Exclusionary Rule
Irrespective of the constitutional source of the exclusionary
rule, whether it is constitutionally required 14 or only an exercise
of the Court's supervisory power,148 it has been law in federal
courts since 1914.149 The following rationales-other than the
protection of privacy-have been enunciated to justify the exclu-
sion of evidence: (1) to provide a personal remedy for a victim of
an illegal search and seizure, (2) to protect the integrity of the
court and (3) to deter illegal police conduct.150
As a personal remedy for the victim of an illegal search and
seizure, the policies of the fourth and fifth amendments again
interact in that it is only the victim who may be incriminated
who can resort to the exclusion of evidence. Evidence is not
barred if one party to a conversation consents to being bugged;' 5'
nor may evidence be excluded if someone other than a defendant
who may be incriminated was the victim of the unlawful search
and seizure."'2 In the latter case, it is not that the search and
seizure are more reasonable, but that a requirement of standing is
imposed to limit those who may pursue the suppression remedy.
144. 91 S. Ct. 2022 (1971).
145. Id. at 2030-31.
146. Id. at 2050-68 passim. Mr. Justice Harlan was compelled to con-
cur by precedent, but suggested that Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) be
overruled. Mr. Justice Black, with whom Mr. Justice Blackmun con-
curred, felt that the fourth amendment supports no exclusionary rule but
that the fifth amendment did. Mr. Chief Justice .Berger could not accept
the proposition that the fifth amendment requires exclusion of evidence
and posed serious doubts about the exclusionary rule in general.
147. See note 141 and accompanying text supra.
148. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 369 (1967) (dissenting opin-
ion, Black J.); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 29, 39-40 (1949) (dissenting opin-
ion, Black J.).
149. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961) made the exclusionary rule of Weeks mandatory on the
States through the fourteenth amendment. See generally Sloane and Leeds,
A Mapp For the Road Towards Exclusion, 35 TEMP. L.Q. 27 (1961).
150. Comment, Benanti Case: State Wiretap Evidence and the Fed-
eral Exclusionary Rule, 57 COLUM. L. Rsv. 1159, 1164-70 (1957).
151. United States v. White, 91 S. Ct. 1122 (1971).
152. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
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This personal interest limitation prevents the person against whom
the evidence is used from having standing to suppress evidence
if he is not the victim of the illegal search and seizure.' 5 Further-
more the victim of the illegal search has no standing to suppress
evidence at trial or before trial if he cannot be incriminated by
the legally obtained evidence. 54 Though there may be more
merit in the exclusionary rule as a personal remedy after Mapp v.
Ohio 1"5 than there was prior to the Mapp case, it affords little
protection to those who are not defendants within the traditional
standing requirements.
The exclusion of evidence can also be justified by the ration-
ale that to admit illegal evidence is to have the court sanction and
thus become implicated in the unlawful conduct of law enforcement
officers." 6  Mr. Justice Holmes expressed the view that it is "less
evil that some criminals should escape than that the Government
should play an ignorable part."157 He went on to say:
For those who agree with me, no distinction can be taken
between the Government as prosecutor and the Govern-
ment as judge. If the existing code does not permit the
district attorneys to have a hand in such dirty business
[wiretapping without judicial authorization] it does not
permit the judge to allow such inequities to succeed." 8
This second rationale seems to have had weight in the defense
of entrapment 5 9 and in cases of evidence extracted from defend-
ants in violation of established procedures. 160 Similarly, the Court
has felt constrained to compel disclosure upon request of evidence
favorable to the defense withheld by the prosecution.' 6 ' The above
are some instances in which the courts, concerned with the integ-
rity of the court and law enforcement, have acted in part to avoid
disrespect for themselves and for the law.' 62
153. Id. at 174.
154. This is the converse of the Alderman situation and the issue in
Evans and Egan. See notes 61-78 and accompanying text supra.
155. 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (After this case the exclusionary rule could
be utilized in all State criminal cases).
156. See, e.g., Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 150 (1954) (dissenting
opinion); Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. 114, 128 (1942) (dissenting
opinion).
157. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 470 (1928) (dissenting
opinion).
158. Id.
159. See, e.g., Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
160. See, e.g., McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 345 (1943)
(murder confession obtained by long hours of interrogation during which
defendant was intimidated and cajoled).
161. See, e.g., Brady v. United States, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
162. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (dissenting opin-
Perhaps the most important and currently the favored policy
consideration in support of the fourth amendment is that the sup-
pression of evidence serves as a general deterrent to illegal police
conduct. This imputed purpose of the exclusionary rule seems to
have replaced to some extent the self-incrimination interpreta-
tion of earlier times. 68 Deterrence was implicit in earlier dis-
sents 6 4 and explicit in dicta though not endorsed because it was
not thought to be efficacious.' 6 5 The Court felt at that time that
there were other adequate remedies available so that deterrence as
an objective did not of itself warrant extension of the exclusion-
ary rule.' 66 However, in 1945 Judge Learned Hand, perhaps with
prescience of opinions to come, found "the reason for the exclu-
sion of evidence competent as such, which has been unlawfully
acquired, is that exclusion is the only practical way of enforcing
the constitutional privilege."'167 Similarly, Mr. Justice Stewart
writing for the majority of the Court in Elkins v. United States'6 5
unequivocally stated the "basic postulate of the exclusionary
rule": "The rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair. Its purpose
is to deter-to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in
the only effective way-by removing the incentive to disregard
it." 6 9 This language seems to establish firmly the concept of de-
terrence as justifying the exclusion of evidence.17 0
However, the objective of deterrence has not been controlling
where questions either of consent of one party to a bugged con-
ion, Brandeis J.):
Decency, security, and liberty alike demand that government offi-
cials shall be subjected to the same rules of conduct that are com-
mands to the citizen. In a government of laws, existence of gov-
ernment will be imperilled if it fails to observe the law scrupu-
lously. Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher.
For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example.
Crime is contagious. If the Government becomes a lawbreaker,
it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law
into himself; it invites anarchy. To declare that in the adminis-
tration of the criminal law the end justifies the means-to declare
that the Government may commit crimes in order to secure the
conviction of a private criminal-would bring terrible retribution.
Against that pernicious doctrine this Court should resolutely set
its face.
Id. at 485.
163. Note, 84 HARv. L. REV. 167, 169 (1969).
164. See notes 161, 162, 166 supra.
165. Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 135, 137 (1953); Wolf v. Colo-
rado, 338 U.S. 25, 31 (1949).
166. See, e.g., Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 30, sources cited at n.1
(1948).
167. United States v. Pugliese, 153 F.2d 497, 499 (2d Cir. 1945) (This
was an explanation of the federal rule which was found appropriate by the
court, but the application of which was precluded by precedent since no
federal official was involved in the search).
168. 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
169. Id. at 217. See also Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 181
(1949) (dissenting opinion); see text at notes 224-227 infra.
170. See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965); Mapp v. Ohio, 367




versation"' or standing have been raised.172 Deterrence as an ob-
jective, in fact, has been subordinated to the competing interest
of successful prosecution of criminal defendants by the use of all
relevant evidence. 173 What seems to be required in an analysis of
the exclusionary rule as a deterrent of illegal police conduct is a
balancing test. On one side of the balance are the objectives of
the exclusionary rule-deterrence of illegal police conduct, the
safeguarding of the courts' integrity, and the constitutional rights
of individual defendants. These objectives may well outweigh the
public interest in convicting criminal defendants. However, the
test often used by the courts in determining who may suppress
evidence is standing,17 4 which is not an element of the balancing
process.
There are different types of standing which must be distin-
guished. The conventional standing of article III of the Constitu-
tion derived from the "case or controversy" requirement 175 is not
a problem in cases like Egan and Evans since a witness who
stands in contempt creates a case or controversy.' 7 6 Aside from
the constitutional requirement of a "case or controversy," standing
also concerns "the question of whether the interest sought to be
protected by the complainant is arguably within the zone of inter-
est to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional
guarantee in question.' 77 A witness whose privacy has been in-
vaded by an unlawful search and seizure and who has been cited
for contempt has standing to object to a fourth amendment viola-
tion,178 but this standing does not confer power to make a motion
to suppress evidence. Standing to suppress evidence has tradi-
171. White v. United States, 91 S. Ct. 1122 (1971).
172. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
173. Id. at 174 ("Neither of those cases [Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S.
618 (1965) and Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960)] nor any others
hold that anything which deters illegal searches and seizures is thereby
commanded by the Fourth Amendment"); Note, 83 HARV. L. REv. 167, 168
(1969).
174. See, e.g., Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
175. See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968); Massachusetts v.
Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923); cf. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255 (1953);
Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44 (1943); Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Au-
thority, 297 U.S. 288, 346 (1936) (concurring opinion, Brandeis J.).
176. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, 450 F.2d
199, 224 (3d Cir. 1971) (dissenting opinion).
177. Association of Data Processing Service Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397
U.S. 150, 153 (1970) (This quote is cited in Egan, 450 F.2d 199, 210 as au-
thority that one who has suffered a fourth amendment violation has stand-
ing to object to that violation).
178. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, 450 F.2d
199, 210, 224 (3d Cir. 1971).
tionally been dependent upon whether a defendant in a criminal
trial was an "aggrieved person"-the victim of an illegal search
and seizure."' Requirements of standing to suppress evidence
have undergone turbulent and sometimes inconsistent stages of de-
velopment. 8 0 Standing requirements are to a large extent in-
consistent with the deterrence rationale of the exclusionary rule,
and Alderman v. United States' shows the Supreme Court's un-
willingness to further the deterrence objective by broadening
standing. 8 2 Although standing was a major issue in the Egan and
Evans cases, the majorities of these courts did not feel it wholly
dispositive of the cases. 1 3 However, standing was the dispositive
factor of the same issue when reviewed by the circuit courts de-
ciding the Dudley and Gelbard cases.18 4
D. The Fourth Amendment and the Grand Jury
If the exclusionary rule is to be made applicable to grand
jury proceedings, it must be on the basis of furthering the objec-
tives of the fourth amendment rule rather than on the basis of
standing. There are several analogous situations which could pos-
sibly be broadened to permit immune witnesses to suppress evi-
dence obtained unlawfully. As early as 1906 it was recognized
that although a corporation has no fifth amendment right before
a grand jury (since the privilege against self-incrimination applies
only to a natural person), the corporation does have a fourth
amendment privilege from unreasonable searches and seizures.8 5
In Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States,186 the Court af-
firmed the position that the fourth amendment does have rele-
179. See notes 4, 7, 56-70 and accompanying text supra.
It seems clear to the authors that an immune witness does not have
this traditional standing to suppress evidence either under section 2518
(10) (a) of Title III or under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41 (e).
This issue of standing has been the source of a multitude of cases and
much legal writing. See Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969);
Mancusi v. Deforte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
(1967); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967); Warden v. Hayden, 387
U.S. 294 (1967); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963); Wong Sun v.
United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505
(1961); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960); On Lee v. United
States, 343 U.S. 747 (1953); Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. 114 (1942);
Greenspan and White, Standing to Object to Search and Seizure, 118 U. PA.
L. REv. 333 (1970); Notes, 38 U. CIN. L. REV. 691 (1969); 34 U. Cm. L. REV.
342 (1967); Comment, 15 N.Y. L. FoRUM 733, 734 and sources cited at n.2
(1969).
180. See cases cited note 179 supra.
181. 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
182. Id.
183. See notes 28, 29, 33, 46, 50 and accompanying text supra.
184. See notes 16-20 and accompanying text supra.
185. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906) (The Court quashed a sub-
poena duces tecum for corporate books and papers as being too broad and
sweeping to be reasonable).
186. 251 U.S. 392 (1920).
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vance to a grand jury proceeding.""7 In Silverthorne, the officers
of the lumber company were arrested and detained during which
time Government officials raided the corporate offices and seized
corporate books and papers. The corporation's officers moved for
return of the property, the motion was granted and the books
and papers returned after the Government had made duplicates.
On the basis of these duplicate copies, the Government subpoenaed
the officers to produce the originals before the grand jury. Their
refusal resulted in contempt citations against them and the cor-
poration. Silverthorne established the doctrine which requires
exclusion not only of evidence obtained by an illegal search and
seizure, but also of evidence suggested by and discovered as a
consequence of such an illegal search.' 88
Judge Adams of the Egan court suggests a similarity between
an immune witness and a corporation in that neither has an argu-
ment under the fifth amendment's prohibition against self-incrim-
ination.8 9 A distinction between Egan and Silverthorne might
be made on the basis that Silverthorne involved a subpoena duces
tecum and not a subpoena ad testificandum as in Egan. However,
this distinction is more form than substance since after the return
of property in Silverthorne, the evidence was not allowed to go to
the grand jury to be used against the officers of the company. 190
Not only was the property returned, but the information derived
from the property was suppressed as tainted evidence. The possi-
bility that a distinction between the two types of subpoenas
could be made on the basis of a property concept of trespass is less
likely in light of the rejection of any property concept as a re-
quirement of unreasonableness of searches and seizures in Katz v.
United States.1 91 Prior to Katz it had been held that for a search
and seizure to be unreasonable, some physical trespass to obtain
evidence was required.192 Other distinctions between Egan and
Silverthorne are that the defendants in Silverthorne had estab-
lished the illegality of the search and seizure in a previous hearing;
that the Silverthorne defendants were the object of the grand
jury's investigation; and that they had not been granted immu-
187. Id.
188. Id. See Comment, The Rights of a Witness Before a Grand Jury,
1967 DUKE L.J. 97, 108 (1967).
189. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, 450 F.2d
199, 211-12 (3d Cir. 1971).
190. Silverthorne v. United States, 251 U.S. 392 (1920).
191. 389 U.S. 374 (1967) (wiretapping of phone conversations made
from public booth was held to be an unreasonable search and seizure).
192. Id. at 353.
nity.193 In summary, Silverthorne is less than a clear precedent for
the proposition that a witness cannot be indicted as a result of
that evidence.
It is not clear what affect an invocation of fourth amendment
rights by a witness or a potential defendant may have on a grand
jury proceeding. The Supreme Court in Costello v. United States1
9 4
held that there was nothing in the fifth amendment that opened
grand jury indictments to challenge upon the ground that they
were not supported by competent or adequate evidence. 19 5 In
Lawn v. United States'9" the defendants were brought before a
second grand jury where they moved to suppress illegally obtained
evidence, which had been previously presented to a grand jury
which was dismissed because defendants had not been warned of
their fifth amendment rights against self-incrimination. The dis-
trict court ruled that suppression could be moved for at trial and
that there was no proof that tainted evidence would be used to
obtain a second indictment. 97 The Supreme Court affirmed
conviction of the defendants, saying that they were not entitled
to a pretrial preliminary hearing to enable them to satisfy unsup-
ported suspicions that derivative use of tainted evidence was made
to support the subsequent indictment. 198 The Court stated in dicta
in Blue v. United States'99 that even if tainted evidence were pre-
sented to a grand jury in violation of defendant's fifth amendment
rights, "this would not be a basis for abating the prosecution pend-
ing a new indictment, let alone barring it altogether. '20 0 The Court
further stated that the defendant, at most, would be entitled to
suppress evidence and its fruits at trial.20 1 This apparently pro-
vided sufficient protection for the fifth amendment right against
self-incrimination.
202
However, circuit courts have interpreted Costello, Lawn, and
Blue differently. An indictment obtained in violation of constitu-
tional rights (in this case the right against self-incrimination and
the right to counsel) must be dismissed, at least where substantial
prejudice results.20 3 In Laughlin v. United States0 4 appellants
193. In re Evans, 452 F.2d (D.C. Cir. 1971).
194. 350 U.S. 359 (1956).
195. Id. at 364.
196. 355 U.S. 339 (1958).
197. Id. at 347-48.
198. Id. at 350.
199. 384 U.S. 251 (1965); see notes 101-103 and accompanying text
supra.
200. Id. at 255.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Jones v. United States, 342 F.2d 863, 872-73 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (The
court distinguished Costello and Lawn saying that it was implicit in both
that an indictment would be invalid if use of tainted evidence had been es-
tablished, but that in neither case was a constitutional right violated since
only incompetent not unconstitutional evidence was presented to the grand
jury).
204. 385 F.2d 287 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1003 (1968).
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moved to dismiss an indictment because their telephone had been
illegally tapped and the recordings of their conversations played
before the grand jury. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals
ruled that defendants had ample opportunity at trial to prevent
ultimate prejudice from the Government's illegal action and that
although the evidence was ruled illegal at a prior perjury trial,
the Court could not as a matter of law say that the illegal phone
recordings tainted the entire proceeding.205 Since unconstitution-
ally obtained evidence would have no probative value at trial
against a defendant, there seems to be no sound reason for per-
mitting it to get before a grand jury.200  It has been suggested
that existing procedures could be utilized to process motions to
quash indictments based on unconstitutionally acquired evidence
when the legality of the evidence is questioned at the grand
jury. 20 7 But in West v. United States,20 8 the Eighth Circuit Court
recognized the purpose of the exclusionary rule to be deterrence
of illegal police conduct and, nevertheless, held that the exclu-
sionary rule does not apply to grand jury proceedings because it
would not significantly further that policy while it would substan-
tially interrupt the criminal process. 20 9 Another factor is thus
placed in the balancing test-swift judicial administration.
If an indictment cannot be challenged on the grounds that il-
legally seized evidence went before the grand jury and the exclu-
sionary rule cannot be invoked in a grand jury proceeding, what
then is the significance of the fourth amendment to a grand jury
witness? The answer to this inquiry must be that if the witness is
granted immunity, without which he would be indicted, or is in
fact innocent, so that no indictment is forthcoming, the fourth
amendment has no significance. On the other hand, if the witness
is not granted immunity or is a target defendant, the fourth
amendment acquires vitality via the fifth amendment privilege
205. Id. at 291.
206. Comment, Criminal Procedure-Grand Jury-Validity of Indict-
ment Based Solely on Hearsay Questioned When Direct Testimony is Avail-
able, 43 N.Y.U. L. REv. 579, 580 (1968).
207. Id. See also Note, 111 U. PA. L. Ruv. 1154, 1169-70 (1964); A pre-
trial hearing would not entail the delay claimed in Costello since the uncon-
stitutional seizure issue would eventually be raised at trial. This argument,
of course, would have no bearing in the Egan and Evans situation where the
immune witness will not have such an opportunity at trial.
208. 359 F.2d 50 (8th Cir. 1966).
209. Id. at 56. The court cited as authority Costello. The same court
in Tarvestad v. United States, 418 F.2d 1043, 1049 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. de-
nied, 397 U.S. 935 (1970), cites West, Costello, Lawn and Blue as disposi-
tive of the fifth amendment issue that a grand jury consideration of illegally
obtained evidence does not render an indictment invalid.
against self-incrimination. 210 Surely this is anomalous. A poten-
tial defendant may have less reason to interrupt a grand jury pro-
ceeding for a hearing on the source of the Government's informa-
tion than an immune witness since the former has recourse to the
remedy of suppression at trial whereas the latter has no other op-
portunity to vindicate a fourth amendment violation. Suppression
of evidence in a grand jury proceeding by a witness with immunity




E. Other Remedies of an Immune Grand Jury Witness
(1) Civil and penal sanctions.
Other remedies of an immune grand jury witness to vindicate
a violation of his fourth amendment right against unreasonable
searches and seizures remain to be examined. Civil and penal
sanctions insofar as they are presently available 212 are not adequate
to compel observance of constitutional protections.213 Justice Tray-
nor writing for the majority of the California Supreme Court
when that court adopted the federal exclusionary rule in People
v. Cahan214 observed:
Despite the persuasive force of the foregoing arguments
[against the exclusion of evidence] we have concluded
that evidence obtained in violation of constitutional guar-
antees is inadmissible .... We have been compelled to
reach that conclusion because other remedies have com-
pletely failed to secure compliance with constitutional pro-
visions on the part of police officers .... "I
Justice Traynor went on to state, "Experience has demonstrated
. .. that neither administrative, criminal nor civil remedies are
effective in suppressing lawless searches and seizures."21 6  Mr.
Justice Murphy dissenting in Wolf v. Colorado 217 stated even more
conclusively:
Alternatives [to the exclusionary rule] are deceptive.
Their very statement conveys the impression that one
possibility is as effective as the next. In this case their
210. See, e.g., DiBella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121 (1962).
211. See Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 205 (1969) (dissent-
ing opinion). Justice 'Fortas' language supports the proposition in suggest-
ing that standing requirements to suppress evidence should be extended to
allow a defendant, whose privacy has not been invaded though he was the
object of the search and seizure, to also make a motion to suppress as "the
only means to secure the observance of the fourth amendment." Id. at 206.
212. See notes 40, 83-89 and accompanying text supra.
213. See Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 205 (1969) (dissent-
ing opinion, Fortas J.); People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 445, 447, 282 P.2d
905, 911-12, 913 (1955); notes 168, 170 supra.
214. 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955).
215. Id. at 445, 282 P.2d at 911.
216. Id. at 445, 282 P.2d at 913.
217. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
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statement is blinding. For there is but one alternative
to the rule of exclusion. That is no sanction at all.218
It is difficult to envision the prosecution of federal agents for
unauthorized wiretapping, and, perhaps more difficult to envision
the federal agent as a defendant in a tort action for invasion of
privacy.2 19 In either of these adversary proceedings, the burden
of proof upon the injured plaintiff or the prosecution in proving
the wiretap would be prohibitive at least, and virtually impos-
sible without cooperation from the very parties moved against. 220
In instances where Government authorities were not themselves
prosecuting the victim of the wiretap or involving him in the prose-
cution as a witness, the wiretap would go undiscovered. 22 1
(2) Creation of a new witness privilege
Another possible remedy as discussed by the Egan court is
whether section 2515 of Title III creates a witness privilege when
the witness has been the victim of unlawful police conduct. 222
There are well-established privileges against compelled disclosure
of confidential communications between husband and wife2 23 and
attorney and client2 24 recognized at common law. In addtion
there are various statutory privileges from testifying about confi-
dential communications between physician and patient2 25 and
priest and penitent. 226 Any of these privileges if properly in-
voked would excuse a witness from testifying about privileged
matters before a grand jury or in a criminal trial, and if errone-
ously denied would serve as a defense to a contempt citation for
218. Id. at 41.
219. But cf. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau
of Narcotics, 91 S. Ct. 1999 (1971) allowing a cause of action for damages
against federal officials for a warrantless search and seizure and entry into
plaintiff's apartment.
220. Id. at 2012. The dissenting opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Burger,
while not endorsing the damage action of the majority of the Court because
he deems it judicial legislation, states the many shortcomings of the ex-
clusionary rule. In relating a structure for a statutory scheme for damages
at 2018, the Chief Justice states that electronic eavesdropping presents spe-
cial problems. Though deterrence of illegal police conduct is a desired
goal, the Chief Justice concludes without empirical evidence, that the exclu-
sionary rule is ineffective to attain that goal.
221. People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 447, 282 P.2d 905, 913 (1955).
222. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, 450 F.2d
199, 206, 224-25 (3d Cir. 1971).
223. See, e.g., Blau v. United States, 340 U.S, 332 (1951).
224. See, e.g., Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
225. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2380-2391 (McNaughton Rev. 1961).
226. Id. § 2394.
the holder of the privilege.2 7 Perhaps the most frequently uti-
lized witness privilege is that against self-incrimination guaranteed
by the fifth amendment. 22 Recently another constitutionally
founded qualified witness privilege based upon first amendment in-
terests was recognized in Caldwell v. United States.229 The Ninth
Circuit Court held that the Government must show a compelling
need for a journalist's presence at a grand jury proceeding to out-
weigh jeopardy to the public's first amendment right to know
before the witness' attendance will be commanded. 23 0 The court
not only vacated the contempt citation, but also vacated the order
directing attendance before the grand jury. 2 1 Neither the Egan
nor the Evans court used language indicating that the witness'
attendance before the grand jury would not be required. 23 2 Ex-
cluding the fact that the Egan and Evans privilege may affect a
greater number of prosecutions the privilege of keeping silent
when questions are based on illegal wiretaps seems to be a less
pervasive privilege than that enunciated in Caldwell.
The Egan and Evans courts held that section 2515 of Title
III stated a prohibition against the use of evidence obtained by
unlawful wiretaps, and that prohibition served as a defense to a
contempt citation. 233 It is not clear when or how such a privilege
may be asserted. Judge Rosenn's language in Egan234 is to the ef-
fect that the privilege may be asserted only defensively in the
event of a contempt proceeding. As such it is a somewhat limited
privilege since a witness must suffer contempt before the privilege
is of any value. It would not seem to require a preliminary hearing
on the source of the Government's information anytime prior to
the contempt hearing. As a defense to a contempt charge there
seems to be substantial case precedent that the fourth amendment
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures applies.
235
It has been argued that Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States
3 6
227. See, e.g., cases cited notes 223, 224 supra.
228. See, e.g., Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479 (1951).
229. 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. granted, 91 S. Ct. 1616 (1971).
Caldwell, a New York Times reporter covering Black Panther Party activi-
ties, refused to appear before a grand jury to testify and alleged his inter-
views with party members were illegally wiretapped.
230. Id. at 1089.
231. Id. at 1090.
232. But cf. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 444 F.2d 499, 500 (3d Cir.
1971) (The same court as in Egan indicates that Egan recognizes a right
to a preliminary hearing on the source of the Government's information
prior to a contempt hearing).
233. See text at notes 33, 46 supra.
234. See text at note 33 supra.
235. See notes 185, 186 supra. In Caldwell v. United States 434 F.2d
1081, 1090 (9th Cir. 1970) the court specifically reserved the fourth amend-
ment issue of whether unconstitutional wiretapping of a witness would be
a basis for quashing a subpoena and requiring a hearing on the source of
the Government's information.
236. 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
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stands for the proposition that a grand jury witness may not con-
stitutionally be held in contempt for failure to respond to a Gov-
ernment issued subpoena duces tecum derived from the fruits of an
improper search and seizure.237 If the Government could use
its reading of books and papers, admittedly taken unlawfully, the
return of which was compelled by law, to subsequently subpoena
the production by a target defendant of these same books and
papers, "[i] t reduces the fourth amendment to a form of words.
' '238
Although these words may be consonant with other language of
Mr. Justice Holmes,2 39 it is doubtful that the Court has since found
them so broad and persuasive as has been suggested.
240
If section 2515 of Title III did create a right for a witness to re-
main silent when the Government has based its subpoena and ques-
tions on an illegal wiretap of that witness, there is no evident
reason why that right cannot be asserted prior to a contempt hear-
ing. It is submitted that a recognition of a witness privilege,
whether founded on Title III or the fourth amendment, would re-
quire a hearing on the source of the Government's information,
and this hearing should precede any contempt hearing. As such it
would precede any question of immunity and obviate the necessity
of much subsequent procedure in the grand jury.241 A hearing on
the allegation of the witness that there had been an illegal wire-
tap would dispose of the entire matter.242 Such a privilege would
seem to further fourth amendment policies attributed to the ex-
clusionary rule.2 4 1 It could well deter unlawful police conduct
by assuring law enforcement officers that the victim of the illegal
search and seizure would not be a purging vehicle of tainted evi-
dence against others. This would make the deterrence policy
more comprehensive by adding another dimension to the effect
237. Brief for Appellant at 13, In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Harris-
burg, Pennsylvania, 450 F.2d 199, 211 (3d Cir. 1971); contra, In re Grand
Jury Proceedings, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, 450 F.2d 199, 230 (3d Cir. 1971)
(dissenting opinion); In re Evans, 452 F.2d , (D.C. Cir. 1971) (dissent-
ing opinion).
238. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920).
239. See notes 157, 158 and accompanying text supra.
240. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, 450 F.2d
199, 230 (3d Cir. 1971); In re Evans, 452 F.2d , (D.C. Cir. 1971).
241. A witness normally would have to appear and have questions ad-
dressed to him. Upon invoking the fifth amendment, the grand jury pro-
ceeding must be interrupted, application for immunity made, and a hearing
granted. The witness must again appear, immunity being granted, and
again be addressed questions. If he continues to refuse to answer, a con-
tempt hearing with counsel present must follow.
242. 'For statutory procedure to be followed, see notes 65-68 and accom-
panying text supra.
243. See notes 151-174 and accompanying text supra.
of the existing exclusionary rule. A privilege would preclude
the court's sanction of illegality as would exclusion of evidence.
Insofar as another witness privilege would burden the system of
criminal justice,24 4 it would only be significant to the extent that
it would inhibit law enforcement officials who have transgressed
constitutional and statutory protections of the private citizen by
failing to obtain the required prior judicial authorization for elec-
tronic surveillance.
(3) Motion to quash subpoena based on illegally obtained evi-
dence.
Courts have, however, quashed grand jury subpoenas on
grounds that they were unreasonable under the fourth amendment
in that they impinged upon the prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures. 245 In the recent case, In re Dionisio,24 the
Seventh Circuit Court held that a subpoena compelling a witness
to make voice exemplars to be compared with authorized wiretap
recordings violated the fourth amendment rights of the witness. 2
47
The court quashed the subpoenas and vacated the contempt judg-
ments.248  It must be noted that these cases 249 involved sub-
poenas duces tecum where physical evidence was required to be
produced and that the subpoenas themselves constituted the un-
reasonable searches and seizures. In the Egan and Evans cases the
illegal search and seizure preceded and was alleged to be the basis
of the subpoena. The distinction raises the question whether it is
the procedure which follows and is based upon a fourth amend-
ment violation which is to be condemned as well as the procedure
itself which violates the fourth amendment. However, in In re
Dionisio the court specifically rejected the argument that the wit-
ness has a subsequent remedy in the exclusion of evidence at trial
saying that "[t]he issue . . . is narrowed to a determination of
whether the interposition of the grand jury between the witness
and the Government eliminated the fourth amendment protection
which would otherwise bar the Government's obtaining the evi-
dence. '250  In the cases of Sister Egan and Carol Evans, the
grant of immunity, the fact that there is no indictment, means that
244. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, 450 F.2d
199, 223-24 (3d Cir. 1971) (Judge Gibbons in his dissenting opinion claims
that third party witness controversies will substantially burden the courts).
245. United States v. Guterma, 272 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1959); Schwim-
mer v. United States, 232 F.2d 855 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 833
(1956); see also Application of Certain Chinese Family B. & D. Ass'ns,
19 F.R.D. 97 (N.D. Cal. 1956); Application of Linen Supply Cos., 15 F.R.D.
115 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
246. 442 F.2d 276 (7th Cir. 1971).
247. Id. at 280.
248. Id. at 280-81.
249. See cases cited notes 245, 246 supra.
250. 442 F.2d 276, 280 (7th Cir. 1971).
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if they cannot attack the subpoena, there is no other opportunity
for them to vindicate their constitutional rights. 2 5 1 Unlike the
indicted defendant, there will be no possibility of suppression at
trial.
IV. CONCLUSION
Let us re-examine the situation in the Egan and Evans cases.
The procedural steps are:
1. The Government wiretaps a phone without judicial authori-
zation.
2. It obtains information which when presented to a grand jury
may show probable cause why five (hypothetical) defendants
should be criminally prosecuted.
3. The Government seeks immunity for one of those five de-
fendants to compel him to testify against the other four.
4. Since this individual is now immune from prosecution he
has no standing to object to the presentation of otherwise illegally
obtained evidence.
5. His public testimony purges the evidence of taint.
6. The Government convicts the other four defendants who
have no standing to object since they are not directly the victims
of illegal searches and seizures.
Such a procedure adds a new dimension to the questionable
existing practice of using illegal evidence to convict a defendant
who has no standing to object to an unlawful search and seizure.
Immunity compels the witness, who has already been injured,
to cleanse the tainted evidence by giving public testimony. If
upheld, this device is not only antithetical to the deterrence ra-
tionale of the fourth amendment, it actually encourages unlawful
activity. The maximum price the Government must pay for its
illegal conduct is the possibility of incurring civil damages and
the sacrifice of one defendant.
A rule which allows a witness to prohibit illegally obtained
evidence from reaching a grand jury either by suppression or by
silence cannot be based on the wording of Title III. Some of the
judges concurring in the decisions of Egan and Evans have clearly
indicated that the results of the courts are contrary to the wording
and intent of the statute. In Egan, Judge Rosenn's concurring
opinion states that the position of the court, which interprets sec-
251. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, 450 F.2d
199, 212 (3d Cir. 1971); In re Evans, 452 F.2d , (D.C. Cir. 1971).
tion 2515 as a flat prohibition to the introduction of illegally ob-
tained information, is inconsistent with the intent of section 2518
(10) (a) which makes that prohibition conditional upon standing.
252
In Evans, Judge Wright's concurring opinion justifies the result
of the court by stating that the traditional notion of standing may
not be applicable where a witness is before a grand jury with
immunity and can never be a defendant. 253 In an effort to avoid
a constitutional issue the Third and District of Columbia Circuits
have twisted the meaning of the words in Title III in order to
justify a result which the statute never intended. The remedy that
Sister Egan and Carol Evans are relegated to under Title III is a
recovery of civil damages as provided in section 2520.254
However, unless unlawful Government conduct is to go un-
checked, the constitutional question must be faced. Under present
law the exclusionary rule is not applicable to grand jury proceed-
ings 25 5 and a witness in a trial or a grand jury proceeding does
not have the requisite standing to move to suppress evidence. 25 6
Policies underlying the exclusion of evidence,257 especially deter-
rence of unlawful police conduct, would be furthered by an ex-
tension of the exclusionary rule. It is submitted that either abro-
gation or broadening of standing requirements would allow an im-
mune witness to suppress evidence.
It is submitted that any type of civil suit for damages is an
insufficient deterrence of unauthorized wiretapping because of the
difficulty in ascertaining and proving that a wiretap has taken
place. The recognition of a new witness privilege 258 would be the
most appropriate means of eliminating illegal Government wiretap-
ping. Without the ability to compel an immune witness to purge
tainted evidence, the Government could not convict defendants on
the basis of its own illegal conduct. Mr. Justice Holmes stated the
proposition 43 years ago as:
The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of
evidence in a certain way is that not merely evidence so
acquired shall not be used before the Court but that it shall




252. 450 F.2d 199, 219 n.5 (3d Cir. 1971).
253. 422 F.2d , (D.C. Cir. 1971).
254. See note 83 and accompanying text supra.
255. See note 209 and accompanying text supra.
256. See notes 180-82 and accompanying text supra.
257. See notes 151-74 and accompanying text supra.
258. See notes 241-44 and accompanying text supra.
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